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Abstract
If local communities living adjacent to the elephant see it as a burden, then they cannot be
trusted to be its stewards. To assess their valuation of it, a CVM study was conducted for one
CAMPFIRE district in Zimbabwe. Respondents were classi￿ed according to their preferences
over the elephant. The median WTP for the preservation of 200 elephants is ZW$260 (US$4.73)
for respondents who considered the elephant a public good while the same statistic is ZW$137
(US$2.49) for those favouring its translocation. The preservation of 200 elephants yields an
annual net worth of ZW$10,828 (US$196) to CAMPFIRE households. However, the majority
of households (62%) do not support elephant preservation. This is one argument against
devolution of elephant conservation to local communities. Adequate economic incentives must
be extended to local communities if their majority is to partake in sound elephant conservation.
External transfers constitute one way of providing additional economic incentives.
JEL CLASSIFICATION: C25, H41, Q26
KEYWORDS: CAMPFIRE, contingent valuation, double bounded spike model, elephant,
Zimbabwe
1 Introduction
Agriculture and wildlife conservation compete for the scarce land in rural Zimbabwe. Wildlife
conservation must compete economically with agriculture, which is the prime source of rural com-
munities￿livelihood, if it is to be accepted as an alternative land-use. Thus the survival of wildlife
depends on whether it is an asset or liability to the communities living adjacent to it. More of-
ten, even when the people in wildlife abundant areas are furnished with community development
bene￿ts from wildlife revenues, they still lose out in economic terms from the presence of wildlife
(Emerton 2001). Of interest in the policy realm is assessing the economic value that the local com-
munities living adjacent to national parks, game reserves and safari areas assign to wildlife, given
that some people potentially consider it a public good while others consider it a public bad. If
the economic value of wildlife were larger, relative to alternative economic activities, then it would
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1imply that wildlife conservation might be enhanced through devolution of wildlife user rights to the
local communities.
This has been tried in Zimbabwe. At the initiative of the parks and wildlife agency, the property
rights regime under which wildlife in communal areas is managed changed substantially in 1989.1
The program is known as CAMPFIRE, an acronym for Communal Areas Management Programme
for Indigenous Resources. This paradigm attempts to involve the rural people as partners, to
marry conservation with development. CAMPFIRE entails giving local communities, through their
administrative local authorities called Rural District Councils (RDCs), (a) greater control over
formerly public wildlife in communal areas in de￿ned territories, (b) enhanced capacities to add
value to local wildlife, and (c) speci￿c ￿nancial rewards likened to alleged conservation value of
wildlife within their territories (Gadgil and Rao 1995). CAMPFIRE begins when the RDC is granted
the legal authority to manage its wildlife resources. Over the years, the RDCs have harvested their
natural resources and earned income in the following ways: leasing trophy hunting concessions,
utilizing forestry and forest products, leasing eco-tourism sites and making live animal sales. The
incomes from CAMPFIRE has increased from 350 000 USD in 1989 to 2,3 million USD in 2001.
Out of a total of more than 20 million USD in revenues, almost 90% come from sport hunting fees.
Almost half of the total revenues have been disbursed to the participating communities (Hasler
1999). These revenues have mostly been used to provide social infrastructure i.e. construction of
schools, clinics, boreholes, etc.
In this paper, we analyze whether the underlying tenant for this policy holds. We concentrate
on the elephant as the representative wildlife since the elephant is the most important species to
the local communities both in terms of the damage it causes to crops and the value it contributes
to CAMPFIRE revenues. In general, the bene￿ts from the elephant are (i) products that can be
consumed directly, such as income from live sales, meat, hides, trophies, (ii) tourism, (iii) ecological
and environmental services such as maintenance of the African savannas and biodiversity, (iv)
possible future uses such as touristic, pharmaceutical, industrial and agricultural applications, and
(v) intrinsic values such as religious, cultural, aesthetic, existence and bequest signi￿cance (Emerton
2001). The costs that the elephant imposes include (i) management costs such as costs of equipment,
capital, wages, running costs, policing, etc, (ii) costs to other livelihood activities in the form of
crop destruction, human injury, damage to structures, etc, and (iii) opportunity costs in the form
of alternative land, money, time or resource uses. The bene￿ts of the elephant potentially accrue
at both global and local levels while the costs occur exclusively at the local level. The international
component of elephant bene￿ts gives room for international transfers to help locals with, and
reward locals for, elephant conservation. This has been the motivation for international support
to CAMPFIRE. However, external aid should reach to the producer communities if these are to
respond to it as increased demand for conservation.
The objective of this paper is to estimate the willingness to pay (WTP) for the preservation of
a sub-population of the African elephant (Loxodonta africana) in Zimbabwe by rural communities
who live adjacent to a designated game reserve, taking into account the reality that some people
consider it a public good while others consider it a public bad. We do this by employing the
contingent valuation method (CVM) for the case of one CAMPFIRE district, Mudzi. The rest of
the paper is arranged as follows: Section 2 reviews literature on the economic valuation of non-
marketed environmental goods (bads). Section 3 describes the survey area while section 4 describes
the survey, presents sample characteristics and gives economic rationale for the bid function. Section
5 presents estimation results while concluding remarks are given in section 6.
1Though e⁄orts started in 1985, CAMPFIRE is o¢ cially recognized to have emerged in 1989.
22 Economic Valuation of Non-marketed Environmental Goods
(Bads)
Many environmental projects generate both winners and losers. If a respondent is asked to state her
WTP in an open-ended contingent valuation question, it might not occur to her to state a negative
WTP if she dislikes the project (Kristr￿m 1995). With the dichotomous choice question format, it is
di¢ cult to pose the question in such a way that potential losers are identi￿ed. The most commonly
employed approach for capturing welfare losses in contingent valuation studies has therefore been
to make assumptions regarding the negative tail of the WTP distribution, after eliciting the WTP
for a change in the provision of an environmental amenity. Nonetheless, this approach typically
does not allow respondents themselves to bid negative amounts (Clinch and Murphy 1999). By
restricting WTP to being non-negative, contingent valuation studies routinely ignore the fact that
many environmental amenities manifest themselves as costs to some and bene￿ts to others.
We use an approach where respondents are split into two sub-samples according to their stated
preference for the project and each sub-sample is analysed separately (cnf. Clinch and Murphy,
1999). The ￿rst question asked the respondent how his/her household weighed the bene￿ts and
costs of living with the current elephant population of 200, by considering only those bene￿ts
and costs applicable to them. The district-wide elephant population was estimated at 200 and all
respondents were asked about this population.
If the respondents indicated that the bene￿ts of living with an elephant population of 200
exceeded the costs, B > C, then they would be expected to have a non-negative WTP for the
preservation of the current elephant population.2 They were then presented with a proposal that
the government was considering translocating the current elephant population of 200 from their
district to other districts so that the people there could also bene￿t from the elephant since it is a
national heritage. However, they could avoid the elephant translocation if their community could
pay an annual ￿ translocation avoidance￿tax to the government (see questionnaire in Appendix for
exact question formulation). They were then asked whether their household was willing to pay an
annual ￿ translocation avoidance￿tax of ZW$x for as long as these animals shall be in their area,
given that all other households who do not ￿nd the elephant to be a nuisance will also pay the same
amount, so that they could be allowed to continue living side by side with an elephant population
of 200.34
If the respondents indicated that the bene￿ts of living with an elephant population of 200
were surpassed by costs, B < C, then they would be expected to have a positive WTP for the
translocation of the current elephant population. They were therefore presented with a similar
proposal di⁄ering only in that they had to pay a ￿ translocation and compensation￿tax in order for
the government to be able to carry out the translocation of the current elephant population from
2Actually, some respondents may say that bene￿ts exceed costs yet they will eventually report a zero WTP,
possibly due to the eventual correction of initially misrepresented preferences in the wake of a demand for them to
declare concrete evidence of their preferences by making a payment. To allow for such zero WTP we categorise those
for whom bene￿ts exceed costs as having a non-negative WTP, rather than positive WTP.
3The starting bids that were chosen on the basis of data collected in a pilot survey were x￿{30, 190, 250, 330,
500}. We used the 20th, 35th, 50th, 65th and 80th percentiles.
4In fact, the double bounded dichotomous choice with open-ended follow-up question format was used here. The
annual ￿ translocation avoidance￿tax presented for the same project in the second question was (i) some lower amount
ZW$xL if the respondent answered ￿ no￿to ZW$x, or (ii) some higher amount ZW$xH if the respondent answered
￿ yes￿to ZW$x. The respondents were eventually asked to state their household￿ s maximum WTP for the project
presented to them.
3their district to other districts, where the nuisance that they have been experiencing from these
animals will consequently be transferred. They were then asked whether their household was willing
to pay an annual ￿ translocation and compensation￿tax of ZW$x for as long as these animals shall
live in the other area, given that all the other households who ￿nd the elephant to be a nuisance
will also pay the same amount, so that the translocation and compensation exercise of an elephant
population of 200 could be carried out.5
Even though our approach enables us to classify respondents into distinct categories based on
their assessment of elephant bene￿ts and costs, we have a challenge of disentangling and appro-
priately analysing potential zero WTP that could eventually be reported by some respondents.
This information is obtained from an open-ended follow-up question and a debrie￿ng question. All
respondents who reported zero WTP despite their elephant bene￿ts exceeding costs or elephant
bene￿ts being surpassed by costs attributed their zero WTP to the budget constraint.
The elicitation format was a double-bounded question followed by an open-ended question. In
the analysis of the double bounded responses we assume that the preferences are the same in the
￿rst and second stage (see e.g. Haab and McConnell 1997). However, when estimating the model
we introduce the spike information obtained from the follow-up open ended question (Kristr￿m,
1995). Let us assume a linear WTP function
WTPj = ￿zj + "j
where zj is a vector of socio-economic characteristics (including an intercept), ￿ is the corresponding
parameter vector and " is an error term, where var(") = ￿2. If the error term is logistically
distributed and we allow for a spike at zero, mean WTP for individual j is ln(1 + exp(azj))=￿,
where ￿ is the marginal utility of money (Kristr￿m, 1995). Mean WTP for individual j is ￿zj=￿:6
3 The Survey Area
Mudzi rural district lies in the north-eastern part of Zimbabwe on the border to Mozambique. The
whole district￿ s area of 4,222 square kilometres lies in agro-ecological regions IV and V, which are
best suited for extensive cattle and wildlife ranching.7 The district has a population of 23,995
households, 16 administrative wards, 7 chiefs, 9 headmen and 700 village heads. The Ministry of
Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare (1997) reported that, according to the Food Poverty Line
and Total Consumption Poverty Line, Mudzi was the fourth poorest district in Zimbabwe. Mudzi
borders Nyatana game reserve and in 1992 Mudzi Rural District Council (RDC) got Appropriate
Authority (AA) status to manage its share of wildlife in Nyatana alongside the adjacent Rushinga
and Uzumba-Maramba-Pfungwe (UMP) RDCs.8 In 1993, a safari operator called Zindere Safaris
was contracted for 5 years (March 1993 to February 1998) to utilise the annual wildlife harvesting
quotas issued by the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management (DNPWLM). The
5The double bounded dichotomous choice with open-ended follow-up question format was also used here.
6It can be noted that this result requires that exp (￿zj)￿(0;1): We assume that the ￿ and zj vectors we are
working with give us such a result.
7Based primarily on the amount and reliability of rainfall, Zimbabwe is divided into ￿ve agro-ecological regions
of generalised land use potential. For purposes of agriculture, region I is excellent land while region V is marginal
land.
8The landscape of Nyatana is such that there could be long term movements of wildlife between and amongst the
three rural districts￿boundaries even though in the short run distinct clans of wildlife can be identi￿ed and ownership
assigned to the three RDs.
4safari operator paid an annual concession fee of ZW$15,000 (US$2,300) and 80% of the trophy
fees. In 1994, 12 elephant bulls were translocated into Nyatana game reserve with the help of
Zindere Safaris and an organization called Elephant for Africa. In the late 1990s, a bu⁄er zone
was established and the safari operator harshly enforced the bu⁄er zone borders denying adjacent
communities access to fodder, timber and grass. Due to enormous pressure from the communities
the safari operator￿ s contract was not renewed.
Since March 1998 a new safari operator called Umfurudzi Wilderness Safaris has been engaged
to utilize the wildlife harvesting quotas on a 20-year contract. In 1999 eight elephant bulls were
translocated into Nyatana game reserve with the help of Elephant for Africa and the new safari
operator. Elephant translocations are resented by some communities who argue that the elephant
is already locally overpopulated considering the high incidence of elephant intrusion. At the time
of the survey there were plans to re-stock Nyatana game reserve with an elephant population of
100, among other species, with grants from Elephant for Africa and USAID.
Two wards, Mukota A and Chimukoko, with a population of 3,009 households and covering
1,009 square kilometres have been designated as CAMPFIRE wards. These are the only wards in
Mudzi that border Nyatana. 70% of wildlife revenue is shared equally amongst 7 villages in these
two wards while the remaining 30% is retained by the RDC for district development (15%) and
administrative expenses (15%). The villages decide how to use their share of the proceeds from
game without any interference from the RDC. The revenue has been used to undertake various
community projects such as buying scotch-carts for ferrying local materials for construction of the
local clinic, building a classroom block at the nearby school, construction of blair toilets, a pre-
school and roo￿ng teachers￿houses, buying cattle for hiring out to members, maize trading, sinking
boreholes and water trophies for livestock, buying some fence, textbooks, building materials for the
local school and building a court-room for the traditional chief. The RDC audits the villages￿books
of accounts and adjudicates misuse cases.
4 The Survey
A questionnaire was administered in Mudzi rural district in December 2000 to 570 randomly se-
lected households.9 Given the objective of valuing the elephant from the adjacent communities￿
perspective, the extent of the market was demarcated by proximity to Nyatana game reserve. Thus,
our interest was in households that live in wards that have been designated as CAMPFIRE wards.
The questionnaire sought basic household data, household participation in CAMPFIRE activities,
data on human-wildlife con￿ ict and compensation, stated preference survey and data reliability
(see questionnaire in appendix). The focus groups and pilot study indicated that it was di¢ cult to
obtain time series data on incomes and production. The heads of the households or their interview
representatives were the interviewees and in both cases responses can be interpreted as coming from
the heads themselves. The age range of the heads of households was 17 to 90. The basic sample
characteristics are shown in table 1.
9Given the rapidly changing economic situation in Zimbabwe, we give justi￿cation why results from data collected
in December 2000 are still relevant in section 5.1. The reasons centre on the microeconomic nature of our study and
our focus on one particular rural community and its relationship with wildlife, a relationship which we do not believe
has been shifted signi￿cantly by the events that have unfolded in Zimbabwe post-2000. In any case, any potential
e⁄ects of the rapidly changing economic situation on our study only serve to amplify the case against devolution of
wildlife to communities, a case which we put forward.
54.1 Economic rationale for the bid function
The objective of stated preference surveys is to elicit respondents￿valuation of the projects described
to them in scenarios. The reliability of each survey is typically measured through the estimation
of a bid function relating WTP responses to a variety of covariates collected in the survey. The
goal is to assess the extent to which expectations from (i) economic theory, (ii) prior intuition, and
(iii) observed empirical regularities are ful￿lled. The analysis of those variables that can potentially
a⁄ect WTP can shed light on the robustness of the survey design and implementation of the
study. From a policy perspective, the reasons behind di⁄erences in WTP can therefore be better
understood (K￿hlin 2001).
Since we are dealing with household-level data, household characteristics such as household size,
sex of the household head, age of the household head, education of the household head and total
annual household income are expected to be important in explaining the households￿WTP. The
discussion in this section will be cast for the case of WTP for the preservation of the current elephant
population. The discussion can easily be extended to the case of WTP for the translocation of the
current elephant population.
It is reasonable to think that larger households would bene￿t more than proportionately from a
public good than smaller households. As such household size is expected to have an e⁄ect on WTP
for the preservation of the current elephant population. Male-heads are more in contact with nature
and have more ways to cope with the elephant nuisance than their female counterparts hence male-
headed households are expected to have higher WTP for the preservation of the current elephant
population. Education helps people to appreciate the (use and passive use) value of the elephant,
or lack of it, since they can easily comprehend the externalities associated with it. Also, people
with higher levels of education might have more opportunities to earn (additional) income from
o⁄-farm activities or they might have bigger farms hence they are relatively more cushioned from
the negative e⁄ect of the elephant. Households with higher annual incomes are expected to a⁄ord
relatively higher WTP as they may have less income constraints. Age of the household head might
in￿ uence how the elephant is valued depending on the extent to which the di⁄erent age categories
of household heads uphold culture and traditions or are a⁄ected by the elephant.
Attitudinal variables are also expected to be important in explaining the households￿di⁄erences
in WTP for the preservation of the current elephant population. In this broadly de￿ned category
we have variables such as support of parks agency driven elephant conservation; respondents were
asked whether they would support parks agency driven elephant conservation rather than com-
munity driven elephant conservation. Wildlife revenue investment decisions are expected to di⁄er
between the parks agency and the communities. A plausible scenario is one where investment by
the community increases the threat of elephant intrusion while perceived investment by the parks
agency could reduce it. In community driven conservation, the community might use wildlife income
to purchase communal livestock and declare some land adjacent to the wildlife reserve a bu⁄er zone.
For members with personal livestock this decision reduces grazing land, increases grazing compe-
tition, denies everyone access to other resources in the bu⁄er zone and possibly does not reduce
human-elephant con￿ ict. Indeed, in many CAMPFIRE areas, in general, and Mudzi, in particular,
wildlife incomes have been used for social infrastructure rather than intrusion preventive measures.
In parks agency driven elephant conservation, the parks agency might be expected to use wildlife
income to fence o⁄ the wildlife reserve. Households potentially support parks agency driven ele-
phant conservation rather than community driven elephant conservation regardless of whether they
consider the elephant a public good or nuisance.
The next set of potentially interesting variables is that indicating the elephant￿ s access to the
6means of livelihood of households and the household￿ s risk of su⁄ering elephant intrusion. The
following variables are in this category: existence of intrusion mitigation measures, distance to the
elephant reserve, labour-days spent guarding against elephant intrusion, average size of intruding
elephant herd, and having agriculture as a main livelihood activity.
Those households who have cushioned themselves from elephant intrusion by installing mitiga-
tion measures such as thorny shrub fences are expected to regard the elephant as being less of a
nuisance, all other things being equal. Distance to the elephant reserve captures a certain kind of
risk of elephant intrusion; if agricultural activities of a household are closer to the elephant reserve
there is a greater chance that they will be intruded, ceteris paribus. The households that spend
relatively more labour-days guarding against elephant intrusion, all other things remaining equal,
are more likely to view the current elephant population as a public bad because their guarding
e⁄orts indicate a higher level of intrusion risk. Furthermore, guarding against elephant intrusion
represents an opportunity cost of labour. If a larger elephant herd potentially has access to a
household￿ s assets then that household is expected to have a lower WTP for the preservation of the
current elephant population compared to those households who face intrusion threats from a smaller
herd. Households whose major source of livelihood is agriculture would be expected to be more
concerned about probable elephant intrusion than those whose livelihood is ￿nanced elsewhere,
ceteris paribus.
There are two potential e⁄ects of using labour guarding against elephant intrusion. On the one
hand, this labour investment could manage to reduce the threat from elephant intrusion in which
case the households that spend relatively more labour-days guarding against elephant intrusion are
more likely to view the current elephant population favourably if such labour has zero opportunity
cost. By spending relatively more labour-days guarding against intrusion the household a⁄ords
to cushion itself from the adverse e⁄ects of intrusion. If labour has a zero opportunity cost the
household cannot enhance welfare by moving labour from intrusion prevention activities since the
reallocated labour will not bring a return from any other activity i.e. intrusion prevention is all
the labour is suited/valuable for. On the other hand, this labour investment could take away
scarce labour from other more productive uses in which case the households that spend relatively
more labour-days guarding against elephant intrusion are more likely to view the current elephant
population as a public bad because there is an opportunity cost of labour. The household would
surely want to reallocate labour into other more productive activities and increase welfare. In
must be noted that, in both cases, spending relatively more labour-days guarding against elephant
intrusion might indicate a higher level of intrusion risk which potentially contributes to viewing
the elephant as a public bad. In our view, the households that spend relatively more labour-days
guarding against elephant intrusion, all other things remaining equal, are more likely to view the
current elephant population as a public bad because their guarding e⁄orts indicate a higher level
of intrusion risk and opportunity cost of labour.
If a larger elephant herd potentially has access to a household￿ s assets then that household is
expected to have a lower WTP for the preservation of the current elephant population compared to
those households who face intrusion threats from a smaller herd. Households whose major source of
livelihood is agriculture would be expected to be more concerned about probable elephant intrusion
than those whose livelihood is ￿nanced elsewhere, ceteris paribus.
75 Estimation Results
We begin by estimating the determinants of respondents seeing the elephant as a public bad.
Knowledge of the characteristics of those households who are likely to view the elephant as a negative
externality could help in designing appropriate compensation schemes or targeting devolution of
elephant user rights to speci￿c groups of people. This is done with a simple probit model. Next we
use the double-bounded spike model to estimate the WTP functions for the two sub-samples where
the elephant is considered either a public good or a public bad. The results are reported in Table
2.
[Insert Table 2 here]
We begin with analyzing the results of the ￿rst stage probit model. The results show that
households headed by older people have a higher probability of viewing the elephant as a nuisance.
We could say that, in our study, the majority of older household heads and their households ￿nd
the elephant to be a liability. Thus when you go into the district and try to ￿nd out who does not
like the elephant, the majority of them will tend to be older household heads and their households.
But in the group of people disliking elephants there will be both young and old household heads.
A lower level of education increases the probability of viewing the elephant as a public bad.
This might be so for two reasons. Firstly, poorly educated household heads seem not to appreciate
the positive externality from the elephant. This may be because the positive externality also
comprises passive use values, which are not easily measurable. When the positive externality from
the elephant is undervalued there is the likelihood that the intrusion threat posed by the elephant
will be harshly penalised. Secondly, people with low levels of education might have few opportunities
to earn (additional) income from o⁄-farm activities or they might have smaller farms hence they
derive their livelihoods from the activities that are directly negatively a⁄ected by elephants. The
observed negative e⁄ect of distance to the elephant reserve on the probability that a household
views the current elephant population as a nuisance is expected. Intuitively, the farther away one
is from the elephant reserve the lower the risk of elephant intrusion, ceteris paribus. Conversely,
the closer one is to the elephant reserve the higher the risk of elephant intrusion.
Households that have experienced intrusion from larger elephant herds are more likely to believe
that the bene￿ts are lower than the costs of preservation. This should follow from the expectation
that actual damage is directly related to the size of the intruding elephant herd.
Those households who spend relatively more labour-days guarding against elephant intrusion
are more likely to view the elephant as a public bad. Guarding against elephant intrusion is likely
an indication of intrusion risk. Those who spend more time guarding therefore face a higher level
of intrusion risk. Furthermore, more time spent guarding against elephant intrusion represents
a greater opportunity cost of labour ￿ the time could have pro￿tably been used in competing
agricultural or other tasks or leisure.
Poor households, with low household incomes, are more likely to view the elephant as a public
bad. Here, similarly to the case of less educated people, poor households seem not to reckon, at
least some part of, the positive externality from the elephant. Consequently, the negative e⁄ect of
the elephant is emphasized.
The results from the probit model show that households who view the elephant as a public bad
typically have these characteristics: older household heads and/or lower levels of household head￿ s
education. Furthermore, more time spent guarding against elephant intrusion, proximity to the
elephant reserve, susceptibility to larger elephant herds and low household income reinforces their
perception of the elephant as a net cost.
8The message that can be drawn from these results is two-pronged: Firstly, appropriate compen-
sation schemes should be designed so that they can adequately bene￿t households who view the
elephant as a public bad. These households can not be expected to support conservation measures
until their view of the elephant as a negative externality has been changed. The appropriate com-
pensation schemes should improve the incentive system at the local level rather than at the district
level.
Secondly, where devolution of elephant user rights is targeted to speci￿c groups of people it is
advisable not to target it to groups that are composed of a majority of households with the stated
anti-elephant characteristics. In areas where CAMPFIRE operates, decisions are taken on the basis
of the majority-voting criterion, where the voting unit is the household. In the absence of su¢ cient
incentives, dominance of households with the stated anti-elephant characteristics in the group to
which devolution is targeted is likely to lead to the failure of collective action in community-based
elephant conservation.
We now consider the results from the double-bounded spike model. The coe¢ cients for the
bid in both situations where the elephant is considered either a public good or a public bad are
highly signi￿cant and have the expected positive sign.10 The coe¢ cients show that the probability
of accepting the presented bids decreases as the size of the bid increases. Thus we are dealing with
an ordinary commodity whose demand increases as the price falls.
Now focussing on the group of people who dislike the elephant, there will be both young and
old household heads and their households, though older household heads and their households will
be in the majority. Given that the presented bids for elephant translocation are proxies for damage
su⁄ered at the feet of the elephant, we would expect both young and old household heads and
their households to seek for an opportunity to be presented with bids which capture the damage
they su⁄er. Our results show that younger household heads and their households have a higher
probability of accepting the presented bids for the translocation of the elephant.11 Thus the few
younger household heads whose households dislike the elephant tend to su⁄er more damage from the
elephant than the many households in the same group who are headed by older heads. Therefore,
in our study, those older household heads and their households in the public bad category tend to
be more tolerant of the elephant despite the damage they su⁄er from it because their damage is
not as high as that su⁄ered by the other households in the same group which are led by younger
heads.
In the class of those households who view the elephant as a public bad, those households headed
by people with relatively higher education had a greater probability of accepting the presented bids
for the proposed elephant translocation. A higher level of education enhances the appreciation
of the externalities associated with the elephant; the positive externality from the elephant also
comprises passive use values which are not easily measurable and the damage in￿ icted during
elephant intrusions is not usually obvious. In the case of elephant damage, in some instances,
one has to extrapolate the trend of growth of a destroyed crop to assess the loss incurred from
elephant intrusion. Such assessments even burden specialist agricultural o¢ cers and that is one
10We entered the bid in the model with a negative sign hence the positive bid coe¢ cient should be interpreted as
showing that the bid is negatively related to the probability of accepting the bid in the double-bounded spike model.
11This result should not be read as a contradiction with that from the probit model. One might erroneously
contemplate a contradiction emanating from the fact that older household heads and their households are more
likely to consider the elephant as a public bad and yet they are less likely to accept the bid. In the double-bounded
model we are comparing the younger and older household heads who form the group of households who view the
elephant as a public bad. They both su⁄er damages but the younger heads tend to su⁄er relatively more than their
older counterparts.
9of the reasons why schemes to compensate elephant intrusion victims have not taken o⁄ in many
places. So a higher level of education enriches the appraisal of the externalities associated with the
elephant and thereby leads to greater acceptance of the presented bids. It can also be argued that
the higher likelihood of accepting bids is not just coming from the education function of enhancing
the appreciation of externalities associated with the elephants but might also be due to higher
o⁄-farm income earning opportunities and bigger farm sizes that highly educated people tend to
access.
In the double-bounded spike model where the elephant is considered a public bad, we ￿nd
a positive and highly signi￿cant coe¢ cient for those that state that they support parks agency
driven elephant conservation rather than community driven elephant conservation. Thus, support
for the parks agency increases the probability of a household accepting the presented bids for the
proposed elephant translocation. This shows the tendency of households who support the parks
driven elephant conservation to accept contributing the presented amounts of money meant for the
removal of the elephant. This represents the vote of con￿dence that such households have on the
parks agency￿ s capability to reduce human-elephant con￿ ict.
The coe¢ cients for the labour-days against intrusion variable in both models where the elephant
is considered either a public good or a public bad have negative signs. This entails that households
who spend relatively less labour-days guarding against elephant intrusion have a greater probability
of accepting the presented bids for either the proposed elephant translocation or elephant preser-
vation. For the households where the elephant is considered a public bad, less labour-days spent
guarding against elephant intrusion mean the imposition of greater costs (i.e. more intrusion) by
the elephant and the households are more willing to pay something to get rid of this cost. This
result can clearly be understood by noting that in the category of households who view the elephant
as a public bad there are low and high labour investors in guarding against elephant intrusion, even
though the majority of them would be the high labour investors. In the group of these households
who dislike the elephant, those with low labour investment have a greater probability of accepting
the presented bids. This implies that they su⁄er relatively more damage at the feet of the elephant.
Why might this be so? It could be the case that by having low labour investment they also get
less cushioned from elephant intrusion than their high labour investing peers. This points towards
the e⁄ectiveness of using labour against elephant intrusion. Of course by investing less labour
against intrusion they possibly re-allocate some labour into other activities but welfare losses due
to inadequate intrusion prevention might be great. They might also invest less labour due to non-
availability of labour i.e. they might be labour-constrained. For the households where the elephant
is considered a public good, less labour-days spent guarding against elephant intrusion still mean
the imposition of some costs by the elephant but the households are nevertheless more willing to
pay for its preservation. This is likely because of proportionately lower costs (i.e. greater bene￿ts)
that they get from the elephant since they still report that bene￿ts exceed costs despite their low
labour investment. These households do not have to invest so much in preventive activities. In
the event that they are not labour constrained, they re-allocate some labour into more productive
activities.
The message from the double-bounded spike model is that the WTP responses obtained from
the study are not random. Most importantly, the bid coe¢ cients show that the probability of
accepting the presented bids is inversely related to the size of the bid. Thus we are dealing with an
ordinary commodity whose demand increases as the price falls. Furthermore, the WTP responses
are related to some of the covariates collected in the survey, particularly in the sub-sample where
10the elephant is considered a public bad.12
5.1 Welfare Measures for the Preservation of an Elephant Population of
200
This sub-section reports the mean and median WTP for the preservation and translocation of an
elephant population of 200 for the two13 sub-samples where the elephant is considered as either a
public good (N1=197) or a public bad (N2=352).
The method of splitting the respondents into (i) those with preference for conservation of the
elephant population, (ii) those indi⁄erent to preservation, and (iii) those preferring a translocation
of the current elephant population proved to be appropriate. Each of these categories represents
32%, 24% and 44% of the sample, respectively. The splitting method ensured that respondents were
confronted with the appropriate project matching their class of preferences. Blindly confronting all
respondents in the main sample with the same project would have resulted in a lot of zero responses
to the elicitation of WTP.14 Instead the splitting method allowed us to obtain valuable information
about the spectrum of preferences and the magnitude of the negative WTP for the preservation
(i.e. the WTP for translocation) of the current elephant population in a designated area.
While the mean WTP for the preservation of the current elephant population for the sub-
sample where B > C is ZW$263 (1.35% of mean annual income or US$4.78) the mean WTP for
the translocation of the current elephant population for the sub-sample where B < C is ZW$146
(0.75% of mean annual income or US$2.65). The median WTP for the preservation of the current
elephant population for the sub-sample where B > C is ZW$260 (3.35% of median annual income
or US$4.73) while the median WTP for the translocation of the current elephant population for
the sub-sample where B < C is ZW$137 (1.77% of median annual income or US$2.49).
The choice of any one of the two welfare measures implies a particular approach to the aggre-
gation of welfare across the population (Hanemann and Kanninen 1999). The mean is equivalent
to adopting the Kaldor-Hicks potential compensation principle while the median is equivalent to
adopting the majority-voting principle. The Kaldor-Hicks criterion is commonly used but it can
lead to logical inconsistencies and it has been severely criticised on ethical grounds (Little 1957,
quoted in Hanemann and Kanninen 1999, p325). While the majority-voting criterion could be con-
sidered as ethically superior, it has been criticised for not satisfying even potential Pareto e¢ ciency.
Thus, the choice of welfare measure is subjective and should ideally conform to the decision rule
dominant in the sampled population.
In areas where CAMPFIRE operates, democratic principles have been instilled to replace the
paternalistic tendencies of traditional chiefs, headmen, and village heads. Every household is given
an equal opportunity to determine the outcome of issues under consideration. Thus, decisions
are taken on the basis of the majority-voting criterion, where the voting unit is the household.
In appraising the valuation of the preservation of the current elephant population in Mudzi, the
median WTP should therefore be utilised, given that the project has already been sanctioned for
adoption as attested to by the granting of AA status to Mudzi RDC. Considering the proportions
12The direct relationship between distance to the elephant reserve and the probability of accepting the presented
bids in the double-bounded spike model is counter intuitive since it suggests that households living farther away have
a greater WTP for the removal of the elephant.
13We do not report the welfare measures for the third sub-sample (N3=21) of households that are indi⁄erent to
the elephant preservation project. In fact, the mean and median WTP for this sub-sample is zero.
14We ￿nd spikes of 0.05 and 0.28 for the two sub-samples. These are quite close to the observed fractions of
respondents reporting zero WTP for either preservation or translocation of the current elephant population.
11of households who are (i) pro-preservation (34%), (ii) indi⁄erent (4%), and (iii) pro-translocation
(62%) of the current elephant population in Mudzi, the median WTPs show that the gainers from
preservation of the current elephant population, in aggregate, bene￿t more than the losers. Table
4 depicts the bene￿t-cost analysis (BCA) of the preservation of the current elephant population.
The table shows that those households who view the current elephant population as a public
good derive an annual value of ZW$266,041 (US$4,837) from its preservation while those who
consider it a public bad su⁄er an annual cost of ZW$255,213 (US$4,640) from its preservation. An
examination of the actual annual incomes from CAMPFIRE activities indicate that Mudzi has been
generating an annual average of ZW$159,526 (US$2,900), which is lower than the costs su⁄ered by
losers from the preservation of the elephant (see Table A3 in the appendix). Those households who
are indi⁄erent to the preservation of the current elephant population put a zero valuation on it.
In principle, if a decision were adopted by the government for the local communities to continue
preserving the current elephant population, as has been done by issuing AA status to Mudzi RDC,
then that would bene￿t part of the population while harming others but, in aggregate, the bene-
￿ciaries would bene￿t marginally more than the losers. The preservation of the current elephant
population in Mudzi yields an annual net worth of ZW$10,828 (US$196) for the households in
CAMPFIRE wards.15However, the majority of the households in the local communities would not
support the decision since 62% of them would rather not have the elephant because they view it as
a nuisance. Thus if it were left to the local communities to decide whether or not the project of the
preservation of the current elephant population in Mudzi should be carried out then the project
would be blocked. There is a fear that imposing the project on the basis that, in aggregate, the
winners bene￿t more than the losers, would result in lack of proactive cooperation from the majority
and that could lead to the failure of collective action in community-based elephant conservation.
The realisation that a majority of households consider the elephant a public bad is one argu-
ment against devolution of elephant conservation to the local communities. Devolution entails the
complete surrender of elephant conservation power. Full ownership of the elephant by the local
communities would therefore imply the complete power to control the access and use of the ele-
phant, and the capacity to hold the elephant for own use or to alienate or destroy it (Schlager
and Ostrom 1993). The spectrum of preferences for the project of the preservation of the current
elephant population shows that there have not been adequate incentives trickling down to the local
communities to encourage a majority of them to change their perspective of the elephant as an
agricultural liability. Devolution of elephant conservation to the local communities in Mudzi could
be detrimental to its survival.
Given the rapidly changing economic situation in Zimbabwe, a comment on why results from
data collected in December 2000 may still be relevant is in order. It is true that the Zimbabwean
economy has been highly unstable since the fast-track land reform programme which commenced
just after the rejection of a proposed new Constitution at a referendum in February 2000. However,
our study focuses on one particular rural community and its relationship with wildlife. We do not
believe that the relationship of our given rural community to adjacent wildlife has been shifted dras-
tically by the events that have unfolded in Zimbabwe post-2000. The crucial changes in Zimbabwe
were brought about by the fast-track land reform programme. This programme a⁄ected ownership
of land in commercial farming areas not rural communal areas. Furthermore, commercial farming
areas are generally in areas of high ecological potential i.e. natural regions 1, 2 and 3. The commu-
15While this ￿gure assumes the feasibility of actual compensation of losers from the preservation of the current
elephant population in Mudzi, in practice there has not been any compensation of victims of elephant damage, in
particular, and wildlife, in general.
12nal areas and the majority of wildlife areas that they live close to are in semi-arid to arid areas i.e.
natural regions 4 and 5. For instance, our area of study wholly lies in natural regions 4 and 5 and
there are no commercial farms nearby. We believe that the estimates we got from data collected in
2000 are still a reasonable re￿ ection of the nature of relationship between our particular community
and adjacent wildlife. The major e⁄ects that one might count of the rapidly changing economic
situation in Zimbabwe on our study are that benign tourism has been dwindling due to increasing
political instability and in￿ ation has been rising and the exchange rate has remained overvalued
thereby rendering revenues from wildlife uses valueless now as opposed to 2000. Political instability
has not signi￿cantly a⁄ected wildlife income going to CAMPFIRE since such instability has mostly
a⁄ected non-hunter tourists while CAMPFIRE derives most of its income from hunter tourists, who
are relatively risk tolerant. Thus the changing economic situation in Zimbabwe entails that where
communities were somehow cushioned from the costs of living with wildlife, such cushioning is no
longer substantial, if it still exists, mostly because of in￿ ation and exchange rate e⁄ects. Such an
outcome does not qualitatively change the nature of our results since a larger proportion of people
already view wildlife as a nuisance even with the more valuable revenues than used to be obtained
under CAMPFIRE in 2000. Thus the case against devolution of wildlife to communities, which
we put forward, is even ampli￿ed. To reiterate, devolution of elephant conservation to the local
communities in Mudzi could be detrimental to its survival.
But how much would it take in order to reach such a majority in favour of maintaining the
elephant population? In order to discuss this, a survival function based on the estimated bid
functions in Table 2 is shown in Figure 1; it shows the share of respondents that would vote yes for
a preservation of the elephants at various levels of the bids. It shows that in the case of Mudzi we
are actually very close to a majority with a positive WTP for maintaining the herd size. We have
also superimposed a vertical line representing the average income of ZW$53 from the CAMPFIRE
project. If the returns from CAMPFIRE would be distributed evenly among all households in the
district, this would shift the proportion that would be better o⁄by elephants to about 65%.16 Even
greater participation rates could be reached if a mechanism could be devised that targeted those
with WTP for relocation. An obvious candidate would for example be an insurance scheme where
receipts from CAMPFIRE were used to compensate farmers hurt by elephant intrusion.
Adequate economic incentives must thus be extended to the local communities if a majority of
them is to be persuaded to partake in sound elephant conservation. Given that studies generally
show that a majority of people in countries that are not endowed with the African elephant have a
positive WTP for its preservation (see for example Vredin, 1999), external transfers constitute yet
another way of providing additional economic incentives to encourage elephant conservation by local
communities such as Mudzi. However, external aid should be channelled directly to the producer
communities if they are to respond to it in terms of increased interest in conservation. Given that
wildlife conservation potentially increases the aggregate welfare of the local communities and that
decentralisation of elephant user rights has already been adopted with the inception of CAMPFIRE,
co-management should be the preferred mode of communities￿involvement in wildlife conservation.
This gives room for checks and balances so that mistakes overlooked at the local communities￿level
can be recti￿ed by other organisations. Co-management acknowledges the multiple jurisdictions
16This statement presupposes that the current provision of local public goods by CAMPFIRE is not already
internalized in the bids given. Unfortunately, it is impossible to know, ex post, how much of the returns are already
internalized by the respondents. Given the obvious problems of targeting the receipts to public goods in a way that
is superior than what the households could have done themselves, it is not daring to say that the internalized value
is between zero and ZW$53, probably biased towards zero.
13that exist in the conservation of the elephant (Hasler 1999) and also takes advantage of the lower
costs of provision, monitoring, enforcement, con￿ ict resolution, etc that occurs at the local level.
What remains to be done to set co-management in motion is to increase the contestations of the
sub-district local communities and establish adequate incentive schemes.
6 Conclusion
Wildlife conservation must compete economically with agriculture, which is the prime source of
rural communities￿livelihood, if it is to be accepted as an alternative land-use. If the economic
value of wildlife relative to the communities￿other economic activities were larger, then it would
imply that wildlife conservation might be enhanced through devolution of wildlife conservation to
the local communities. This paper, focused on the elephant as the representative wildlife since it
is the most important species to the local communities both in terms of the damage it causes to
crops and the value it contributes to CAMPFIRE revenues. The paper estimated the willingness
to pay (WTP) for the preservation or translocation of a designated sub-population of the African
elephant (Loxodonta africana) in Zimbabwe by rural communities who live adjacent to a designated
game reserve taking into account the reality that some people consider it a public good while others
consider it a public bad.
The paper shows that households who view the elephant as a public bad typically have older
household heads, with low levels of education. Furthermore, more time spent guarding against
elephant intrusion, proximity to the elephant reserve, susceptibility to larger elephant herds and
low household income reinforces their perception of the elephant as a nuisance. This knowledge
could help in (i) designing appropriate compensation schemes or (ii) targeting devolution of user
rights to speci￿c groups of people.
The median WTPs for the projects of preservation or translocation of the current elephant
population is ZW$260 and ZW$137 respectively. Considering the proportions of households who
are (i) pro-preservation (34%), (ii) indi⁄erent (4%), and (iii) pro-translocation (62%), in aggregate,
the preservationists bene￿t the most. However, the majority of households do not support the
project hence imposing it could lead to the failure of collective action or if the local communities
could decide whether or not to carry out the project then it would be blocked. Of importance to
note also is the result that while it is generally believed that poor people are not willing and able
to pay for sound environmental management, as many as 44% of the respondents are willing to pay
for the preservation of the elephant in Mudzi.
The realisation that a majority of households consider the elephant a public bad is one argument
against devolution of elephant conservation to the local communities in Mudzi. The rural commu-
nities￿perceptions of the elephant are generally useful for other species of wildlife since the elephant
is considered a keystone species and, most importantly, an umbrella species in the African Savan-
nas. However, the discussion of the survival function of bids indicated that if adequate economic
incentives can be extended to the local communities then a majority of them could be persuaded
to partake in sound elephant conservation. External transfers constitute yet another way of pro-
viding additional economic incentives to encourage elephant conservation by local communities. It
is obvious from this study that CAMPFIRE has not been successful enough in doing this in Mudzi
yet.
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Table A1: Summary statistics for the open-ended WTP question with 200 elephants 
  
  In the Market  Out of the Market 






Number of households 
(including those with zero 
WTP in the market) 
352 197 21
H/holds with zero WTP in 
the market 
99 15 Not applicable
Mean WTP including zero 
WTP in the market 
110.43 389.54 Not applicable
Median WTP including 
zero WTP in the market 
50.00 250.00 Not applicable
Mean WTP excluding zero 
WTP in the market 
153.64 421.65 Not applicable
Median WTP excluding 
zero WTP in the market 
100.00 250.00 Not applicable
 
Table A2: Summary statistics for the open-ended WTP question with 100 elephants 
  
  In the Market  Out of the Market 






Number of households 
(including those with zero 
WTP in the market) 
345 198 27
H/holds with zero WTP in 
the market 
133 14 Not applicable
Mean WTP including zero 
WTP in the market 
74.29 258.36 Not applicable
Median WTP including 
zero WTP in the market 
20.00 175.00 Not applicable
Mean WTP excluding zero 
WTP in the market 
120.90 278.02 Not applicable
Median WTP excluding 
zero WTP in the market 
100.00 175.00 Not applicable
 
Table A3: Mudzi Rural District’s Annual Income from CAMPFIRE Activities (ZW$) 
 
Year  GDP Deflator  Current (ZW$)*  Current (US$)*  Deflated (ZW$) 
1994 19.356  28,000 3,410 144,656
1995 21.205  - - -
1996 26.676  44,488 5,958 166,767
1997 30.997  59,488 4,780 191,912
1998 40.059  50,000 2,051 124,813
1999 62.541  226,926 5,919 362,838
2000 100.000  125,695 2,817 125,695
Source: *WWF SARPO, HARARE & WORLD BANK 
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APPENDIX B.  
 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE STUDY ON THE RURAL COMMUNITIES’ 
PERSPECTIVE OF THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF THE ELEPHANT: MUDZI 
RURAL DISTRICT, ZIMBABWE DECEMBER 2000 (translated from the Shona 
questionnaire excerpt of valuation questions) 
 
In answering the questions in the next section may you note that in this rural district there is an 
estimated elephant population of 200. In general, the benefits from elephants are (i) products that can 
be consumed directly, such as live sales, meat, hides, trophies, (ii) education, (iii) tourism, (iv) research 
opportunities, (v) ecological and environmental services such as maintenance of the African savannas 
and biodiversity, (vi) possible future uses such as touristic, pharmaceutical, industrial and agricultural 
applications, and (vii) intrinsic value such as religious, cultural, aesthetic, existence and bequest 
significance. The costs that elephants impose include (i) management costs such as costs of equipment, 
capital, wages, running costs, policing, etc, (ii) costs to other livelihood activities in the form of 
livestock losses, crop destruction, human injury, damage to structures, etc, and (iii) opportunity costs in 
the form of alternative land, money, time or resource uses and profits forgone, including unsustainable 
use. Remember that the elephant accounts for over 80 percent of all the wildlife perpetrated agricultural 
damage but it also accounts for over 65 percent of all CAMPFIRE revenues. 
 
Stated Preference Survey  
a. The district-wide elephant population is estimated to be 200. Considering those benefits and 
costs of elephants that are applicable to your household, how do you think the benefits of 
living with elephants compare with the associated costs? 
(i)  benefits > costs (go to question b)  
(ii)  benefits < costs (go to question c) 
 
b. The government is considering translocating the current elephant population of 200 from 
your district to other districts so that the people there can also benefit from elephants since 
they are a national heritage. However, preliminary calculations show that it is possible to avoid 
the elephant translocation if your community can pay annual ‘translocation avoidance’ taxes to 
the government for as long as the animals shall be in your area. The revenue from this tax will 
then be distributed to the communities without elephants so that they can also benefit 
somehow from these animals. Would your household be willing to pay an annual 
‘translocation avoidance’ tax of ZW$x for as long as the animals shall be in your area, given 
that all other households who do not find elephants to be a nuisance will also pay the same 
amount, so that you could be allowed to continue living side by side with the 200?   Y 
[go to (i)] N  [go to (ii)] 
 
(i) Suppose it turned out that the true annual ‘translocation avoidance’ tax is ZW$x
H, would 
your household be willing to pay it? Y [skip(ii)] N [skip(ii)] 
(ii) Suppose it turned out that the true annual ‘translocation avoidance’ tax is ZW$xL, would 
your household be willing to pay it? Y    N 
(iii) What would be the maximum annual ‘translocation avoidance’ tax that your household 
would be willing to pay? :_______________[Probe if zero] 
 
c. The government is considering translocating the current elephant population of 200 from 
your district to other districts so that your pain of living side by side with the elephants will be 
eased. It is expected that the people there will experience the nuisance that you have been 
experiencing from these animals. Nevertheless the government will insist that these people do 
live with these elephants and receive financial compensation annually. The government does 
not have the money to fund the translocation and annual compensation of the potential new 
neighbours of these elephants and preliminary calculations show that it is possible to 
21translocate the elephants if your community can pay an annual ‘translocation’ tax that could 
then be used for this translocation and compensation exercise of the 200. Your community will 
be expected to continue paying this annual ‘translocation’ tax for as long as the animals shall 
live in the other area. Would your household be willing to pay an annual ‘translocation’ tax of 
ZW$x for as long as the animals shall be in the other area, given that all other households who 
find elephants to be a nuisance will also pay the same amount, so that you could be allowed to 
continue living free from these elephants?   Y [go to (i)] N  [go to (ii)] 
 
(i) Suppose it turned out that the true annual ‘translocation’ tax is ZW$xL, would your 
household be willing to pay it? Y [skip(ii)] N [skip(ii)] 
(ii) Suppose it turned out that the true annual ‘translocation’ tax is ZW$x
H, would your 
household be willing to pay it? Y    N 
(iii) What would be the maximum annual ‘translocation’ tax that your household would be 
willing to pay? :_______________________ [Probe if zero] 
 
22Table 1: Basic sample and sub-sample characteristics 
 Full  sample 
N=570 
B > C sub-sample 
N1=197 
B < C sub-sample 
N2=352 
Characteristics  Mean Std  Dev. Mean Std  Dev. Mean Std  Dev.
Household Size 
 
5.61 2.67 5.35 2.90 5.72 2.49
Sex of Household Head 
(M=1,F=0) 
0.66 0.47 0.64 0.48 0.67 0.47
Age of Household Head 
(years) 
41.84 14.87 37.23 12.53 44.53 15.35
Education-years of 
Household Head 
5.25 4.29 6.85 3.96 4.34 4.17
Distance to Elephant 
Reserve (km) 
10.23 10.32 14.74 12.52 7.46 7.53
Size of Intruding 
Elephant Herd 
5.71 6.34 3.38 6.81 7.19 5.69
Existence of Mitigation 
Measures (Y=1,N=0) 
0.36 0.48 0.21 0.41 0.45 0.50
Support Parks Driven 
Ele. Conservation (Y=1) 
0.28 0.45 0.36 0.48 0.22 0.42
Agriculture as Main 
Activity (Y=1,N=0) 
0.85 0.35 0.81 0.39 0.89 0.31
Labour-days Against 
Elephant Intrusion 
39.17 45.40 14.46 34.06 53.89 44.99
Annual Household 
Income (ZW$) 
19,488 42,493 26,748 55,948 15,763 33,520
 
Table 2: Determinants of the characterisation of the elephant as a public bad and 
estimates from the double-bounded spike model 
Variable  Probit Prob (B<C)  Double-bounded spike model 
      B < C  B > C 
 Coeff  P-value  Coeff  P-value Coeff  P-value 
Intercept 0.1052  0.777  0.4120  0.567  2.8623  0.000 
Bid     0.0142  0.000  0.0128  0.000 
Household Size  -0.0299  0.239  -0.0083  0.862  -0.0297  0.646 
Sex of Household Head  0.0076  0.956  -0.1150  0.638  -0.2522  0.472 
Age of Household Head        0.0172  0.004  -0.0170  0.066  -0.0053  0.715 
Education of Household Head   -0.0396  0.043  0.0631  0.089  0.0292  0.553 
Distance to the Elephant 
Reserve -0.0275  0.000  0.0731  0.000  0.0173  0.220 
Size of Intruding Elephant Herd  0.0189  0.088  0.0120  0.621  -0.0168  0.496 
Existence of Mitigation 
Measures  -0.1515 0.367  0.2570 0.336  0.2069  0.644 
Support Parks Driven 
Conservation    -0.1540  0.260  1.5663  0.000  0.3295  0.291 
Agriculture as Main Activity  -0.0418  0.829  0.6900  0.091  0.5459  0.158 
Labour-days Against Intrusion  0.0106  0.000  -0.0079  0.012  -0.0088  0.069 
Household Income  -0.0420  0.010  0.0138  0.694  -0.0127  0.724 
            
Nobs  549   352   197   
 
23Table 3: Mean and Median WTP for the preservation and translocation of an elephant 
population of 200.  
 
Preservation Sub-Sample 
(B > C) 
Translocation Sub-Sample 
(B < C) 
Median WTP  Mean WTP  Median WTP  Mean WTP 
260.06 
(163.2 - 357.9) 
262.79 
(169.4 - 356.1) 
136.77 
(24.7 – 248.8) 
146.16 
(48.1 – 244.2) 
The exchange rate is 1US$=ZW$55. 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. Standard errors 
calculated with the Delta method. 
 
Table 4: Benefit-cost analysis of the preservation of an elephant population of 200 
 
Preference  N           Sub-Population  Spike Median BCA 
B > C 
B < C 




0.34 x 3009 = 1023
0.62 x 3009 = 1866






ZW$           0
  570                         3009 ZW$  10,828
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